(https://i139.photobucket.com/albums/q305/djmbucket/oddsnends01/howtoplugtheoilleak.jpg)
rofl That probably will not work Don. We know how slipperly they are and they need something solid to work.
Don't drop that in there. The Gulf is polluted enough already.
all jokes aside, the leak is well under 1000' under the seafloor. the BOP, the riser, the junk there showing on tv, it's irrevelant. The wellbore itself is structurally unsound. The oil is following fissures in the bedrock, and then into the methane hydrates where it bubbles up into plumes. At that depth (miles under sealevel), the pressure is in thousands of psi. There is no way to plug this leak. I shouldn't post this, but it's the truth.
Well since it's all ruined anyway I guess they can drill all they want now. ??? Now Houston will really smell funny.
Quote from: ScottA on June 03, 2010, 03:43:01 PM
Well since it's all ruined anyway I guess they can drill all they want now. ??? Now Houston will really smell funny.
Houston is not in that much danger actually, the currents look like it will take the spill around the coast of Florida and once it hits the gulf stream it's the eastern gulf but especially the eastern seaboard that really gets the brunt of it. This is just a projection, not necessarily a prediction. I damn sure hope they are wrong on this.
(http://www.loopy.org/oil_slick_map.jpg)
sickening isn't it.
sources:
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN0324572420100603
http://www2.ucar.edu/news/ocean-currents-likely-to-carry-oil-spill-along-atlantic-coast
Interesting map/projection Muldoon.
Could it be that BP is the guardian of a new clear dawn ?
sparks
"the leak is well under 1000' under the seafloor"
Where did you glean this information?
My biggest worry now is the Hurricane season. NC and parts of Va are only 30 miles from the Gulf Stream and a Hurricane could well drive the oil slick on shore and further up the coast.
Many hurricanes come close to shore and hang a left going North.
Quote from: considerations on June 04, 2010, 10:24:28 AM
"the leak is well under 1000' under the seafloor"
Where did you glean this information?
Public sources for this include:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704875604575280133577164268.html?ru=yahoo&mod=yahoo_hs
QuoteWASHINGTON—BP PLC has concluded that its "top-kill" attempt last week to seal its broken well in the Gulf of Mexico may have failed due to a malfunctioning disk inside the well about 1,000 feet below the ocean floor.
The disk, part of the subsea safety infrastructure, may have ruptured during the surge of oil and gas up the well on April 20 that led to the explosion aboard the Deepwater Horizon rig, BP officials said. The rig sank two days later, triggering a leak that has since become the worst in U.S. history.
The broken disk may have prevented the heavy drilling mud injected into the well last week from getting far enough down the well to overcome the pressure from the escaping oil and gas, people familiar with BP's findings said. They said much of the drilling mud may also have escaped from the well into the rock formation outside the wellbore.
As a result, BP wasn't able to get sufficient pressure to keep the oil and gas at bay. If they had been able to build up sufficient pressure, the company had hoped to pump in cement and seal off the well. The effort was deemed a failure on Saturday.
From the Congressional offices, this note hints at it.
http://energycommerce.house.gov/documents/20100527/Waxman.Statement.ee.05.27.2010.pdf
Quote
What we are now learning is that BP's investigation appears to omit key issues. There have been several reports today concerning questionable well design choices made by BP, including the decisions to use a type of casing that could allow gas to flow up the annular space to the wellhead, to limit the number of spacers centering the casing despite objections by Halliburton, and to curtail the length of time that drilling fluids were circulated to clean gas out of the well. Yet none of these were mentioned by BP when they briefed our staff.
This raises the possibility that BP's internal investigation is not examining the consequences of BP's own decisions and conduct.
Our investigation is examining all potential causes of the blowout, including the responsibility of BP. That is why we are sending a letter to BP today seeking more information on these issues.
More from NOLA -- skip down to spaces between pipes not closed
http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/05/costly_time-consuming_test_of.html
Quote
Spaces between pipes not closed off
Probert also presented Congress with a schematic of BP's cementing plan, which he repeatedly said his firm followed to a T. Although he never mentioned it in his written or verbal testimony, the drawing Probert attached to his prepared testimony May 11 shows what drilling experts say is a key design flaw that could easily have allowed a blast of natural gas to shoot to the surface undetected and destroy the rig before the crew of 126 knew what hit them.
oil-halliburton-cement-052010.jpgView full sizeThe graphic shows the wellhead 5,067 feet below the water's surface and the bottom of the well more than 13,000 feet below that. It diagrams how the drill pipes telescoped down in sections -- some about 2,000 feet long, some shorter and others longer.
With each section, one metal tube fits inside another, leaving a space called an "annulus" where heavy drilling mud can circulate and carry the drilled-out material back up to the surface. According to the diagram, one of the spaces between different-sized pipes was not closed off -- a no-no, according to some experts.
"It looks pretty on paper, but you can't accomplish that successfully and have a good cement job," said Tom McFarland, a cementing consultant from Marrero who has decades of experience cementing oil wells. "The chance of getting a good cement job on that is nil."
McFarland said the diagram indicates the space was completely open to the reservoir of oil the Deepwater Horizon had just tapped, and he is convinced that is why the well blew.
No O-ring seal depicted
McCormack, the University of Texas professor, isn't so sure that the blowout went through the annulus, rather than breaching the center of the well and blowing out the top. But either way, he was baffled by the diagram Halliburton gave to Congress. He was so surprised by the lack of an O-ring seal that he wondered if it was an error.
"There's a free path all the way to the top of the well bore. Normally you wouldn't do that," he said. "If the well was completed as designed, I think that would be an issue the way it's shown there."
McFarland said a cement bond log is costly and takes time, but it would have told the crew right away whether the annulus was exposed to hydrocarbons. He and McCormack said that if the log showed problems, the crew would have done what's called a "perf and squeeze," perforating the weak spots in the liner and squeezing more cement in to defend the well against the gas pressure of the earth formation around it.
BP spokesmen did not respond to repeated requests for comment on the decision to send Schlumberger home without conducting a cement bond log or on the cementing schematic Probert gave the Senate committee. And Halliburton didn't respond to questions about the accuracy of Probert's diagram.
Here is an image of the layout of the well.
(http://media.nola.com/2010_gulf_oil_spill/photo/oil-halliburton-cement-052010jpg-e618a2271a66c847.jpg)
It sounds like, from looking at the diagram you posted muldoon, that this well was designed to fail. Why was the last seal omitted?
Thanks for the references, I've been following this with interest. Particularly the USCG investigation emwhere they are interviewing surviving crew members. So far, I've not heard them ask any questions that directly address this point.
I got this in an email today.
It sounds like what really happened to me.
It claims to have been written by a mug engineer.
You can read it and draw your own conclusions.
Once again, I did not write the following...
Seven Shortcuts Lead to Tragedy
The following is my theory on what happened on April 20th. I have listed factual information to the best of my knowledge, and base this theory on 33 years of experience working on these rigs, with 16 years working as a consultant worldwide. The contractor (Transocean in this case) typically does not do anything without direction and approval from the operator (BP in this case). I believe that there was nothing wrong with the BOP, or the conduct of the crews prior to the catastrophic failure. If any operator drills a similar well using the same flawed casing and cement program, the same results will be very possible.
The well was drilled to 18,360 ft and final mud weight was 14.0 ppg. The last casing long string was 16 inch and there were 3 drilling liners (13 5/8", 11 7/8" and 9 7/8") with 3 liner tops. A 9-7/8" X 7" tapered casing long string was run to TD. The bottom section of casing was cemented with only 51 barrels of light weight cement containing nitrogen, a tricky procedure, especially in these conditions.
The casing seal assembly was set in wellhead and pressure tested from above to 10,000 psi. Reportedly, a lock down ring was not run on the casing hanger. The casing string was pressure tested against the Shear rams, only 16.5 hours after primary cement job. A negative test on the wellhead packoff was performed.
The rig crew was likely lead to believe that the well was successfully cemented, capped and secured. Normally a responsible operator will not remove the primary source of well control (14.0 ppg drilling mud) until such conditions were met. However, the crews were given the order to displace heavy mud from riser with seawater, prior to setting the final cement plugs. They were pumping seawater down the drill string and sending returns overboard to workboat, so there was limited ability to directly detect influx via pit level. This is the fastest way to perform the displacement operation, and the method was likely directed and certainly approved by operator. There was a sudden casing failure during this displacement procedure that allowed the well to unload, with ignition of gas and oil. Evidently, the crew was able to get the diverter closed based on initial photographs, showing flames coming out of diverter lines.
It is likely that pressure built up between the 9 7/8" and 16" casing under the casing hanger, due to gas migration from the pay zone. Based on reported mud weight, the reservoir formation pressure is in excess of 13,000 psi. The pressure building in the cross sectional area below the casing hanger would have increased casing tension and caused casing to collapse and part (rapidly separate) at a connection, probably a joint or two (50' or 90') below wellhead. The collapse pressure for 62.8 ppf 9-7/8" casing is +/- 10,300 psi. However, the collapse resistance of casing is considerably reduced in presence of axial stress (i.e. tension). Engineers - see formula from API bulletin 5C3, section 2.1.5 and run the math. The well then came in violently through parted casing and caused the blowout. Without lockdown ring on hanger, the casing hanger and joint(s) were slingshot up into BOP. That would explain why all components of the BOP are unable to seal or shear. The parted casing section remains across all BOP ram cavities and probably all the way up into the riser.
Shortcut #1: Running a tapered long string rather than a liner with 9-7/8" liner top packer, followed by tieback string and pumping heavy cement all the way to seabed. Perhaps the original permits for this casing program were based on a planned appraisal well, and changed midstream to a producer well, then hastily approved by the MMS. This tragic shortcut may have saved about 1.5 rig days.
Shortcut #2: Insufficient time was used to cure the mud losses prior to cementing the open hole reservoir section, depending instead on using lightweight cement to prevent losses to the formation.
Shortcut #3: The nitrified primary cement job. This is difficult to pull off, even under ideal conditions.
Shortcut #4: Hanger without lock ring may have used due to the previously unplanned long string, and to avoid waiting for hanger with lock ring to be fabricated or prepared.
Shortcut #5: No cement evaluation logs were performed after a job with known high calculated risk (mud losses to formation). This shortcut may have saved 8 hours of rig time.
Shortcut #6: Pressure testing casing less than 24 hours after cement in place can expand the casing before the cement is fully set. This shortcut can "crack" the cement and create a micro annulus which will allow gas migration.
Shortcut #7: Displacing 14 ppg mud from 8000 ft MDRT with 8.7 ppg seawater, less than 20 hours after primary cement is in place. How many tested and proven barriers can you count? I count zero satisfactory barriers. Industry standards dictate that at least two tested (to maximum anticipated pressure) barriers are in place prior to removing the primary source of well control (weighted mud or brine).
what a mess.
Quote from: muldoon on June 02, 2010, 11:02:56 PM
all jokes aside, the leak is well under 1000' under the seafloor. the BOP, the riser, the junk there showing on tv, it's irrevelant. The wellbore itself is structurally unsound. The oil is following fissures in the bedrock, and then into the methane hydrates where it bubbles up into plumes. At that depth (miles under sealevel), the pressure is in thousands of psi. There is no way to plug this leak. I shouldn't post this, but it's the truth.
Thanks, muldoon. I was wondering about that, as much of what they were doing was absolutely absurd.
Kind of like the stuff McGyver does that you know can not possibly work if you know anything about what he's doing.
BP Tetris....
(https://i778.photobucket.com/albums/yy62/the_troglodyte/bptetris.jpg)
ummm ... not funny, eh? [waiting]
Goodbye gulf states....
30 Shocking Quotes About The Gulf Of Mexico Oil Spill That Reveal The Soul-Crushing Horror This Disaster Is Causing
http://www.blacklistednews.com/news-9109-0-0-0--.html
so more continues to leak about about this.
http://www.youtube.com/v/2Bj_kco8qTQ
Quote
Senator Bill Nelson (D-FL): Andrea we're looking into something new right now, that there's reports of oil that's seeping up from the seabed... which would indicate, if that's true, that the well casing itself is actually pierced... underneath the seabed. So, you know, the problems could be just enormous with what we're facing.
Andrea Mitchell, MSNBC: Now let me understand better what you're saying. If that is true that it is coming up form that seabed, even the relief well won't be the final solution to cap this thing. That means that we've got oil gushing up at disparate places along the ocean floor.
Sen. Nelson: That is possible, unless you get the plug down low enough, below where the pipe would be breached.
then again, there is thing thing:
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/06/07/95467/bp-well-may-be-spewing.html
finally. and perhaps my employer may fire me for such, but everyone should see this. and seek an explanation.
...
anyone have an explanation for this?
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/incident_response/STAGING/local_assets/downloads_pdfs/MC252sinking_oil_plan.pdf
this is BP's website, talking about the macondo 252 well. the very well that is the center of attention. This is from April 3rd, and focuses on the assessment of oil leaking.
Now I know that the macondo well original was lost. That it was a mudsucker and that it was five weeks behind schedule. Is there anything that can explain why a BP document from April 3rd talks about oil plumes? The platform sunk on April 20th. The "spill" was after that. Why on earth was there such a document created before that? If you see this, save a copy locally. It may not be there tomorrow.
Seems that explains the short selling - sell offs of stock weeks ago - etc. Someone already knew there was a major booboo and too late to stop it. I read of profiting from the sales of Corexit also.
I had been thinking there was foreknowledge of a problem before you posted this from other things I read. I got a copy also.
I also read of oil plumes from the sea floor a week or so ago.
So there's no way to stop the leak? Well there goes the entire gulf coast and probly Florida too. That's just great. >:(
I dunno, Scott. I don't see it stopping at just the gulf coast and Florida. I don't know if the big ocean theory works that well..... [waiting]
If even get bad enough to destroy Florida this country is finished. The government won't survive the outrage I see comming. They are sitting on a time bomb and trying to hide it from the world.
As a water well driller and having worked in the oil fields, I could see this article being true.
http://www.rense.com/general91/oilor.htm
I am not an expert at wells, I have my strengths, but this is not one of them. In February I could not have told you what a BOP was, now I could draw you one in a napkin. What I have learned has been crashed coursed over the past few weeks as I try to wrap my head around our current disaster. I have a decent understanding of fluid mechanics and when I saw they were going to do ...zyz... I wondered what? To that effect I dug further to understand what was missing from the picture.
I read the article above with great interest. Luckily the article is written in very short paragraphs, sometimes just one sentance a piece. I found myself saying yes. yes. yes. agreeing with each statement as they went on.
However, I do not agree with the final conclusions of the article. The "expectations" part of the article.
QuoteAt some point the drilled hole in the earth will enlarge itself beneath the wellhead to weaken the area the wellhead rests upon. The intense pressure will then push the wellhead off the hole allowing a direct unrestricted flow of oil, etc.
Maybe, but maybe not. The oil is being collected now. The reverse pressure you see on the camera now is desired. In rder for no methane hydrates to enter to pipe and freeze like the original top cap did they do not want water to enter the existing pipe riser. In order for water not to enter the pipe they balance pressure via the 4 valves on the existing cap. It looks terrible for oil to continue squirting out of the video frame, but the reality is that that oil is what is keeping the water from entering and the line from freezing.
Quote
The hole will continue to increase in size allowing more and more oil to rise into the Gulf. After several billion barrels of oil have been released, the pressure within the massive cavity five miles beneath the ocean floor will begin to normalize.
We are currently releasing somewhere between 18k (bp number) and 75k (realistic number) barrels of oil a day. I believe the current number is 40million in total. This statement that billions of barrels will be released is massive. Nobody understands what "several billion" means anymore, I blame it on the financial crises. billion has losts its spark. For several billion barrels to be released, this thing would need to spew for over a decade.
Quote
This will allow the water, under the intense pressure at 1 mile deep, to be forced into the hole and the cavity where the oil was. The temperature at that depth is near 400 degrees, possibly more.
The water will be vaporized and turned into steam, creating an enormous amount of force, lifting the Gulf floor. It is difficult to know how much water will go down to the core and therefore, its not possible to fully calculate the rise of the floor.
This is where it just goes south for me. this thing wont spew for a decade. We wont have a seafloor collapse because this will be closed inside of 30-90 days from now.
The riser is jacked. the well bore is jacked. the well casing is jacked. BUT there is a spot about 19000 feet under the seafloor where the casing is intact and the well can be closed off. This what the relief wells are doing. Since day 3, those wells are going for this. Once they intersect with structurally sound pipe they can stuff in mud to balance pressure, and fill in cement to plug this well.
It wont go on for decades, we don't have to assume worst case here. That being said, and considering the 10 week delay from leaving the well until landing on shorelines, I do not know what that means for the coast. For Florida, or even for the East coast at this point.
One thing, we don't need to borrow trouble, we have enough already. There is no need to make this thing out worse than it is. Its a disaster all by itself.
Thanks for the input, muldoon and greater understanding of what is being done from your point of view. Here's hoping for the best.
Also know that I feel that the oil companies are the only ones fit to tackle this thing as I know what a giant undertaking a land based well is. The complexity of this mile deep monster is almost overwhelming.
The very worst thing that could happen would be if the politicians decide to step in and do something rather than standing along the sidelines making farting noises with their mouths.... [waiting]
I'm not ready to belive a doomsday scenario yet but losing Florida and the gulf coast seems to be a real concern at this point. I've worked in industry long enough to know that accidents of this scale are usualy caused by bean counters. Someone needs to held accountable for the skimping on safety that obviously went on here.
Here's an interesting take on how the bean counters of the previous record holding oil disaster invented the 2008 financial crisis.
How The Exxon Valdez Disaster Destroyed The Economy 20 Years Later (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/08/exxon-valdez-how-that-dis_n_605080.html)
JASON LINKINS - The Huffington Post
The Exxon Valdez disaster, which occurred on March 24, 1989, played a major role in the collapse of the economy some 19 years later. See, as Stein documented, after lengthy litigation, Exxon managed to get the amount of punitive compensatory damages reduced from the hoped-for $5 billion to a paltry $500 million. But, back when Exxon had reason to imagine it might actually have to part with the $5 billion, the oil giant needed to find a way to cover its hindquarters. Exxon found a savior in the form of J.P. Morgan & Co., who extended the beleaguered company a line of credit in the amount of $4.8 billion.
Of course, that put J.P. Morgan on the hook for any potential judgment against Exxon. So the bank went looking for a way to mitigate that risk. Its solution made history, which you can read about in a June 2009 piece from the New Yorker's John Lancaster, entitled "Outsmarted." Here's the relevant portion:
In late 1994, Blythe Masters, a member of the J. P. Morgan swaps team, pitched the idea of selling the credit risk to the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development. So, if Exxon defaulted, the E.B.R.D. would be on the hook for it--and, in return for taking on the risk, would receive a fee from J. P. Morgan. Exxon would get its credit line, and J. P. Morgan would get to honor its client relationship but also to keep its credit lines intact for sexier activities. The deal was so new that it didn't even have a name: eventually, the one settled on was "credit-default swap."
So far, so good for J. P. Morgan. But the deal had been laborious and time-consuming, and the bank wouldn't be able to make real money out of credit-default swaps until the process became streamlined and industrialized. The invention that allowed all this to happen was securitization. Traditionally, banking involves a case-by-case assessment of the risk of every loan, and it's hard to industrialize that process. What securitization did was bundle together a package of these loans, and then rely on safety in numbers and the law of averages: even if some loans did default, the others wouldn't, and would keep the stream of revenue going, thereby diffusing and minimizing the risk of default. So there would be two sources of revenue: one from the sale of the loans, and another from the steady flow of repayments. Then someone had the idea of dividing up the securities into different levels of risk--a technique called tranching--and selling them off accordingly, so that riskier tranches of debt would pay a higher rate of interest than safer ones. Bill Demchak, a "structured finance" star at J. P. Morgan, took the lead in creating bundles of credit-default swaps--insurance against default--and selling them to investors. The investors would get the streams of revenue, according to the risk-and-reward level they chose; the bank would get insurance against its loans, and fees for setting up the deal.
There was one final component to the J. P. Morgan team's invention. The team set up a kind of offshore shell company, called a Special Purpose Vehicle, to fulfill the role supplied by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in the first credit-default swap. The shell company would assume $9.7 billion of J. P. Morgan's risk (in this case, outstanding loans that the bank had made to some three hundred companies) and sell off that risk to investors, in the form of securities paying differing rates of interest. According to J. P. Morgan's calculations, the underlying loans were so safe that it needed to collect only seven hundred million dollars in order to cover the $9.7-billion debt. In 1997, the credit agency Moodys agreed, and a whole new era in banking dawned. J. P. Morgan had found a way to shift risk off its books while simultaneously generating income from that risk, and freeing up capital to lend elsewhere. It was magic. The only thing wrong with it was the name, BISTRO, for Broad Index Secured Trust Offering, which made the new rocket-science financial instrument sound like a place you went to for steak frites. The market came to prefer a different term: "synthetic collateralized debt obligations."
As Lancaster notes: "Inevitably, J. P. Morgan's innovation was taken up by more aggressive and less cautious banks." Oh, you don't say!
Mortgage-based versions of collateralized debt obligations were especially profitable. These C.D.O.s involved the techniques that the J. P. Morgan team had developed, but their underlying assets were pools of mortgages--many of them based on the most lucrative mortgages, the now notorious subprime loans, which paid higher than usual rates of interest. (These new instruments could be pretty exotic: some consisted of C.D.O.s of C.D.O.s, pools of pools of debt.) J. P. Morgan was wary of them, as it happens, because it didn't see how the risks were being engineered down to a safe level. But institutions like Citigroup, U.B.S., and Merrill Lynch plunged in.
Flash forward to 2008, and there's widespread systemic failure that shreds the employment market and sends huge sums of wealth straight to Money Heaven.
So, something you might want to say the next time you hear someone lament that holding BP to account might lead to people losing their jobs is, "Well, I'll see you in 20 years, then, chum, on the breadline!"
Truly, these oil spill disasters are the gift that keeps on boning you, just as hard as the dickens.
Here we go. Nuke it.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CpPNQoTlacU&feature=player_embedded#! (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CpPNQoTlacU&feature=player_embedded#!)
I know people that work for BP. They are truly sick over this. They have talented, bright employees. It would be ashame for them to be punished.
The culture of maintenance and safety starts at the top of the organization. Those few people make millions of dollars a year to make investors money. This is where the pain should be felt.
Unfortunately, I am an investor that wants to make money so I can retire and I want cheap energy. Therefore, I am the enemy, too
That video of the underground nuke closing off a runaway gas pipe leak was quite interesting. I wonder where that was done?
The problems of BP are not good thing for the world economy - let alone its effects on the gulf economy. I hear that one of every seven tax dollars (pounds) the UK collects come from BP. The company has over 10k employees in the UK.
I belive it was in the old USSR somewhere John.
Leak estimate revised up to 2 million gallons a day...wtf? They started out saying 200,000...someone is full of it.
Fox news http://www.foxnews.com/us/2010/06/10/million-gallons-oil-flowing-day-researchers-say/ (http://www.foxnews.com/us/2010/06/10/million-gallons-oil-flowing-day-researchers-say/)
Gosh ---- who'da thunk..... [waiting]
http://countryplans.com/smf/index.php?topic=8898.msg115773#msg115773
... of course I probably underestimated.... [ouch]
I guess I missed that post. Sounds like you nailed it. Does this 120,000 psi number I'm hearing sound realistic?
At 5000 feet depth the sea water pressure to be overcome should be around 2200 psi.
At 18360 feet the water pressure of the ocean water is around 8078 psi.
I am not sure where they get the well pressure but probably from the instruments that were on the rig.
120,000 sounds way high to me, but obviously it is greatly over the weight of the sea water above.
Found it - extra zero there... 12000 which is agreeable with what I calc'ed out.... more than the bottom of the sea pressure.... by around 4000 psi - that should do it.
Quote4) Even at best, the cement is in the upper depths of the well bore where the natural geologic rock structure is the loosest, weakest, most porous and fragile (hell some of it may effectively be silt). The oil and gas, which has a natural well pressure of 12,000 or so psi is going to erode and corrode through and around the cement and the porous well bore rock.
http://emptywheel.firedoglake.com/2010/06/07/senator-nelson-says-bp-well-integrity-may-be-blown/ (note - just a reference I found - I don't know anymore about this guy... )
That sounds more realistic. Lots of oil people around here and ofcourse right now they are all experts on deep drilling. I've been hearing all sorts of crazy stuff. I'm impressed you came up with that flow rate for free. I'm sure the government paid alot of money for the several wrong flow rates they have had since this started. c*
Hey, what can I say, Scott?.... ::)
I worked with my geologist (contract developing for me) on a lot of water wells and he taught me a lot about developing. When he decided to jack his rates up and he cost me too much I was able to take over the job I had been hiring him to do. I don't like to get myself in a position that allows anyone to hold me up by the short hair... [crz]
So I looked at the video... estimated the flow rate from it and cut it in half for the gas I saw coming through. The bad thing is that in my opinion it could be more. I was using a rather low estimate....
Perhaps they would be interested in sending me a check? [ouch]
I always assume that if a politician says it and that they may have investments personally in a corporation, that they will do what they can to feather their own nest. I always assume that they are lying. [waiting]
I heard they were going to put a giant wedding ring on the well head... that's a sure way to make it stop putting out! ;D
Latest BP spill video. It's much worse than anyone imagined. This is a must see.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2AAa0gd7ClM (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2AAa0gd7ClM)
Quote from: ScottA on June 14, 2010, 03:20:44 PM
Latest BP spill video. It's much worse than anyone imagined. This is a must see.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2AAa0gd7ClM (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2AAa0gd7ClM)
That's just about right . . .
./
Quote from: ScottA on June 10, 2010, 11:25:50 AM
I'm not ready to belive a doomsday scenario yet but losing Florida and the gulf coast seems to be a real concern at this point. I've worked in industry long enough to know that accidents of this scale are usualy caused by bean counters. Someone needs to held accountable for the skimping on safety that obviously went on here.
You are confusing the bean counters with the MBA's! ;D Real bean counters just keep score. MBA's are management and authorize "skimping".
Sincerely,
A former bean counter.
Quote from: Native_NM on June 14, 2010, 11:06:19 PM
You are confusing the bean counters with the MBA's! ;D Real bean counters just keep score. MBA's are management and authorize "skimping".
Sincerely,
A former bean counter.
I supose you're right. In a company that large the bean counters wouldn't have much say so. My apologies to the bean counters.